In 2003, the Florida Supreme Court lifted the ban that prohibited sheriff deputies from engaging in collective bargaining. Borrowing data from the Criminal Justice Agency Profile, an annual census of Florida law enforcement agencies, enables this study to entertain two questions. First, what impact did the decision have on job benefits? Second, would restricting analysis to agencies with 100+ sworn members alter the findings? Fixed-effects panel data analyses reveal a noteworthy effect on starting salaries. Focusing on just larger agencies leads to a dramatic underestimation of the decision's impact. The timeliness of this study is appraised in light of pending federal legislation.
Introduction
In January of 2003, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that sheriff deputies had the constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining (Coastal Florida PBA, 2003) . Although Florida municipal police officers began unionizing in 1968 (Pynes & Corley, 2006) , county sheriff deputies were exempted from similar coverage. Chapter 447 (Florida Statutes, 1975) specifically reserved the state legislature's right "to regulate the activities and affairs of labor unions" in sheriff offices (SOs). The Coastal Florida PBA ruling reversed this line of thinking.
This decision prompted an immediate flurry of activity. In the ensuing six months, labor organizations filed 30 petitions with the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) to represent sheriff employees in 18 counties (Cohee, 2003) . Over the next three years, elections to choose a bargaining agent were held in 13 sheriff agencies. Unions prevailed in ten contests and absorbed almost 7,000 potential members (Pynes & Corley, 2006) . Twenty-eight agencies had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in place by the end of 2008. These organizations housed 15,581 sworn personnel or 76% of all sheriff deputies in the state (Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2009 ). This series of events provides an opportunity to investigate the impact of unionization upon salaries and job benefits in Florida sheriff departments. Before going further, it would be helpful to visit the decision in greater detail.
Florida Case Law
The issue of whether Florida deputy sheriffs could unionize arose in Murphy v. Mack (1978) . The key question was whether deputies were "appointees" or "employees." Although the Florida Supreme Court held they were public employees, it noted that the legislature went to great -2-lengths to retain final authorization and to exclude sheriff deputies from collective bargaining (Dietzen, 2000) .
The court reiterated its position when the same issue materialized the following year. As public employees, deputy sheriffs were barred legislatively from engaging in collective bargaining (Ison v. Zimmerman, 1979) . The distinction between "appointee" and "employee" gradually spread to situations involving other state constitutional officers. Eventually, the Florida Supreme Court would retreat from its Murphy dogma.
Service Employees (2000) challenged Murphy by asking whether deputy court clerks were public employees under Florida law. The plaintiff, a staff member of the Clerk of the Circuit Court in Orange County, contended her union activism led to her job termination. The Florida PERC dismissed the allegation of an unfair labor practice under the Murphy logic. The Florida Supreme Court, though, ruled on behalf of the ousted employee, which paved the way to extending collective bargaining rights to sheriff deputies. The justices noted that Article I, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution guarantees private and public employees the right to collective bargaining. It reads:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged.
In tracing legislative intent over the years, the court found ample provisions supporting this constitutional right. More significantly, the justices drew a bright line between "managerial" and "ordinary" employees. They held that managers were not public employees for collective bargaining purposes and that only ordinary employees could unionize. Under common law, the position of deputy officer was a mere extension or appendage of the appointing constitutional officer. With the passage of time, however, the distinction between being "appointed" versus "employed" has become lost.
This change of direction did not go unnoticed. Less than a month after Service Employees was decided, a local law enforcement union filed a petition with PERC to represent Brevard County deputies (Ruby, 2003) . Given the contradiction between Murphy and Service Employees, the Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The first judicial act was to rephrase the question posed in Coastal Florida PBA (2003) .
Instead of determining whether deputy sheriffs were excluded statutorily from collective bargaining, the court investigated whether the state constitution banned such activity. The court emphasized two important points. First, sheriff deputies performed the same work as municipal police officers who possessed collective bargaining rights. Second, the legislature already allowed deputy sheriffs in some counties to unionize. In the end, the court ruled there was no compelling governmental interest to be gained or preserved by depriving some sheriff deputies of the constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining. As a result, the Florida Supreme Court ruling on January 30, 2003 extended the right to collectively bargain to all sheriff deputies. This institutional change prompted the current study. While an additional question will be articulated later, one query surfaces at this point. That is, did the 2003 Coastal ruling impact entry-level salaries and other job benefits for sheriff deputies?
Literature Review
Critics characterize the existing law enforcement collective bargaining literature as terribly outdated, silent on key issues, and constrained by methodological shortcomings. For example, Wilson and his colleagues (2006, p. 23) complained "one of the key limitations in this literature is the lack of recent analysis using data collected after the 1980s." A decade earlier, Zhao and Lovrich (1997, p. 510) lamented "there is an absolute dearth of empirical assessment on the effect of collective bargaining on supplemental compensation levels," a refrain Briggs et al. (2008, p. 229) echoed. Furthermore, studies rely upon cross-sectional data from a single point in time (Briggs et al., 2008, p. 232; Wilson et al., 2006, p. 21) . In short, there is room for improvement.
Wilson et al. (2006) used the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
(LEMAS) data from 1990, 1993, 1997, and 2000 to explore the impact of unionization on starting salaries in 352 municipal police departments. While collective bargaining was responsible for higher entry-level salaries, the economic environment (city budget, per capita income, and unemployment) also contributed to pay differentials. Similarly, Zhao and Lovrich (1997) , along with Briggs et al. (2008) , concentrated on salary supplements (hazardous duty assignments, differential shift pay, education incentives, and merit pay). They, too, analyzed LEMAS data and found that unionization was a significant determinant of these job benefits in large municipal agencies. Although these three studies combined time-series with cross-sectional data, they simply measured the presence or absence of a collective bargaining agent without examining the impact of unions that have operated continuously for long periods.
The findings from these three studies (Briggs et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2006; Zhao & Lovrich, 1997) are congruent with past literature (Delaney, Feuille, & Hendricks, 1984; Feuille & Delaney, 1986; Geley & Chandler, 1995; Hall & Vanderporten, 1977; Ichnioski, Freeman, & Lauer, 1989; O'Brien, 1992; O'Brien, 1994) . Thus, it would appear that collective bargaining in -5-contemporary law enforcement is associated with salary gains and increased job benefits.
Methods

Data Source
In 1997, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) began conducting an annual census of all law enforcement agencies in the state called the Criminal Justice Agency Profile (CJAP). CJAP resembles the national LEMAS inquiry, administered periodically by the federal Department of Justice (Reaves & Hickman, 2004 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the five dependent variables. The average salary during the post-Coastal period was $5,299 higher than the 2000-02 earnings. Annual leave increased by .4 of a day over the same time frames. SOs with salary supplements inched up from 32% to 38%, buy-back provisions moved from 44% of 46% of the agencies, and tuition reimbursement programs changed from 51% to 55%.
-TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE-
Independent Variables
Variables representing agency traits and county economic conditions were gathered to help gauge differences between unionized and non-unionized SOs. Agency characteristics included union status, how many years the union had represented sheriff deputies, sworn size, and fiscal A more probing agency consideration was the creation of a duration variable that tallied the number of years a CBA has been in place. As Ichniowksi et al. (1989) noted, the effects of collective bargaining on law enforcement compensation depend upon state bargaining laws. Since the current sample hails from just Florida, it avoids interstate comparative difficulties. However, the present study adds a new wrinkle by recognizing that not all labor union gains are immediate.
Past studies have relied upon a simple dichotomous measure to reflect whether a CBA was in place. Such an approach overlooks union growth and experience. This study hypothesizes that newly formed unions tend to focus on salary issues initially. Once these concerns are remedied, attention turns to other job benefits. Thus, while unionization impacts salary levels very quickly, the effects on other job benefits are not immediate. One way to capture this influence is to go -9-beyond a presence-or-absence indicator and include the number of years a CBA has been in effect.
This strategy will enable the current study to highlight a delayed relationship, if one exists.
Previous research, based upon large municipal police agencies that responded to the LEMAS inventory, has uncovered other variables connected to employment compensation. The number of sworn personnel sometimes emerges as a weak determinant of salary and benefits (Briggs et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2006; Zhao & Lovrich, 1997) . LEMAS consists of a two-prong data collection effort. The first part surveys all agencies containing at least 100 sworn personnel.
The second portion relies upon a stratified sample of agencies with less than 100 sworn. In contrast, CJAP contains a complete enumeration of all Florida agencies, regardless of size.
The original plan was to include a measure of fiscal capacity, similar to previous studies (Briggs et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2006; Zhao & Lovrich, 1997 Summary statistics for the independent variables appear in Table 2 . The post-Coastal years saw 27% of the SOs unionize, with the typical agent being in place for almost a year (0.82).
The SOs grew in size and the median income rose to $39,479 per household. The unemployment rate dipped from 4.9 to 4.5 over the series.
-TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE-
The Model
The expectation is that unionized SOs will have, on average, higher salaries and increased fringe benefits. A panel or longitudinal model could conceptualize these claims as: An event study should analyze dependent variables in terms of level and growth. Since LEMAS has three to four years elapsing between observations, the prior literature is limited to commenting on level or intercept shifts that stem from unionization. The ability to measure the growth rate or first derivative is lost with the multi-year gaps. Using a full panel, the present study overcomes that hurdle by incorporating changes over time and rewriting the equation as:
The coefficient representing the interaction of Union with Year will indicate whether salary and -11-other job benefits change immediately or are delayed based on the number of years unionized. Turning to post-estimation analysis, a Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test rejects a random-effects model because of significant variation in the county random-error components.
Results
A random-effects approach imposes zero correlation between the independent variables and the counties they describe. In other words, any pertinent variable affecting a county must be well specified. A fixed-effects approach is useful for capturing unobserved variations in each county by relaxing that last assumption to allow correlation and eliminate deviations within the counties.
A time plot (not shown here) warns that annual shocks are likely present because entry-level salaries rise each year for both unionized and non-unionized agencies. Without including the significant year trend factor, residual shocks would have driven up estimated wage coefficients across counties and prevented the error term from representing white noise.
-13-
The remaining panels in Table 4 Perhaps, unions serve some other purpose beyond reforming the selected job benefits.
Discussion
Two focal concerns frame the current study. The first issue is whether the Florida Supreme Court Coastal decision impacted entry-level salaries and other job benefits for deputy sheriffs. Past studies have found that unionization increased salaries (Wilson et al., 2006) and improved supplementary packages (Briggs et al., 2008; Zhao & Lovrich, 1997) . The current analysis reveals that unionization in Florida SOs raised starting salaries immediately and decisively, but did not alter other job benefits over the course of the study period.
The second matter this paper probes is whether restricting the study group to agencies that employ 100+ sworn members, a common cut-off point in the literature, yields comparable results.
Until recently, LEMAS was the sole purveyor of any systematic effort to describe local law enforcement agencies and their operations. Researchers had no alternative data sources at their immediate disposal. As a result, analysts had to be content with the fact that LEMAS completely enumerated larger agencies, but only sampled smaller ones. The advent of CJAP, however, allows an empirical determination as to whether this size restriction produces skewed results.
Initial salary comparisons show that unions are responsible for higher starting salaries when examining all CJAP entrants, but not when the focus is restricted to just the larger SOs. The salary contrast between all CJAP agencies and the bigger SOs is substantial. Using the entire CJAP database, the hypothetical deputy sheriff working under a CBA would accumulate $24,274 more in earnings than his or her non-unionized counterpart. That difference drops to $8,118 when examining just the larger SOs. While union salaries might not be significantly higher in bigger agencies on an annual basis, the cumulative effect of a higher earning power is noticeable.
The results drawn from the multivariate examination of salaries and job benefits depend upon the analytical strategy chosen. If this paper had followed the previous literature and focused on solely the larger SOs, collective bargaining would not have registered a significant impact on entry-level salaries. Furthermore, restricting union status to a simple dummy variable leaves the impression that a CBA exerts an instantaneous shift in benefit levels. The current inclusion of an interaction term highlights the need to measure a growing or fading marginal effect gained from union tenure. Without this interaction term, the 100+ group makes it look like unions have no material impact on any form of compensation. However, for both the CJAP and bigger SOs, collective bargaining registers a change in growth rates on entry-level salary and at least one other benefit. Although other benefits remain relatively unchanged over the 2000-08 interval, unions swiftly secure better buy-back provisions. Overall, a study restricted to larger agencies would have risked overstating the limited results and would have missed out on the possibility that salary supplements improve with prolonged union presence. With these comments in mind, it might be prudent for future researchers to be mindful of this effect when analyzing just larger agencies.
Limitations
Several other aspects deserve attention before embracing these findings as definitive. Second, this paper does not track union activities. Unions can endorse candidates who are running for local offices, make campaign contributions, and mobilize volunteers for numerous tasks. The influence of these activities is not assessed in this study.
Third, Florida is a "right-to-work" state. Even though Coastal authorizes collective bargaining, deputy sheriffs cannot be required to join the union as a condition of gaining or continuing employment. Because Florida unions negotiate on behalf of all in-unit members, they provide representation for both dues-paying members and "free riders." 10 Many labor groups regard their directories as proprietary information and do not disclose membership statistics. As a result, a simple dichotomous indicator regarding union status might not be sensitive to the degree of representation or the strength of a labor group in an agency.
Fourth, it is assumed that all CBAs are equivalent. Even though Carter and Sapp (1992) show that considerable variation exists in contract clauses, no effort was expended to compare and contrast CBA contents. For example, a multi-year wage agreement carved out prior to the current recession might contain much more lucrative terms than pay raises negotiated during a more austere climate, especially one characterized by high unemployment rates and declining budgets.
A fifth consideration is that a local cost-of-living adjustment is not an easy task to Sixth, the present study overlooks one of the most significant union protections, a standardized grievance procedure and the addition of Weingarten rights (National Labor Relations Board v. Weingarten, 1975) .
11
It is true that the state "Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights" (Florida Statutes 2009, Chapter 112.532) , along with the Garrity Rule (Garrity et al. v. New Jersey, 1966) , already guarantee certain procedural safeguards to law enforcement officers under criminal investigation. However, CBAs can afford an additional layer of protection against overzealous and unfair management practices when it comes to disciplinary actions.
12
Seventh, the supplemental job benefits analyzed in this paper are limited to annual leave amounts, salary supplements, buy-back provisions, and tuition reimbursement. Other perks (take--18-home vehicles, clothing/cleaning allowances, wellness program subsidies, cell phones) have gone unnoticed, both in the present study and in the past literature.
Another consideration lies with the effort to integrate the CJAP and LEMAS instruments.
While the two systems may appear similar, they differ in how they acquire responses about collective bargaining. LEMAS asks, "Is collective bargaining authorized for your agency's employees?" The instructions are to check either a "yes" or a "no" box for sworn personnel and again for non-sworn personnel. This approach could invite distortion. For example, prior to
Coastal, only the nine counties that had won legislative approval could respond affirmatively.
After the Coastal decision, all 67 SOs could indicate "yes" because the Florida Supreme Court struck down pre-existing barriers and now authorized collective bargaining for all sheriff deputies.
Being eligible to unionize does not necessarily imply that an agency actually traversed the steps necessary to install a union. In contrast, the CJAP is more direct with its query, "Does your to Coastal and, as a result, they were eliminated from the study group. Had these counties been included, seven would have joined the 100+ sworn member group.
13
Finally, there is a need to consider short-term versus long-term effects. The present study uncovered a delayed effect with the interaction term. There appears to be a five-or six-year lagged impact on starting salaries. Whether it takes longer for spin-off benefits to materialize remains undetermined. It may very well be that certain benefits emerge only after collective bargaining agent has accrued sufficient time to establish an effective stronghold. Negotiations between management and workers can begin only after this three-to-five-month process is completed. Once both sides have come to terms, a formal contract ratification vote must take place before the CBA becomes binding. If management and labor are unable to agree on a contract, an impasse is declared and the matter is referred to a mediator and, if necessary, to a special master for binding arbitration (Florida PERC, 2004) . In light of all these steps and the time they consume, it is highly unlikely that efforts to engage in collective bargaining impinged upon the 2003 salary. 10. "Free riders" are workers who enjoy CBA benefits even though they do not pay union dues.
Conclusion
11. Weingarten protections include the right to have a union representative present during internal affairs interviews.
12. For example, the Florida PERC recently rescinded a five-day suspension levied against a deputy, who also served as a union official, after the Sheriff deemed comments the deputy wrote in a union newsletter were derogatory (Dickey v. Gee, 2009 
